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Introduction
In early 1959, Luiz Rendall Silva, Cape Verdean administrator of the concelho (dis-
trict) of Fogo, on the volcano island of that name in the Sotavento group (Leeward
Islands), wrote a very energetic report to his Portuguese superiors. He complained
to the Governor of Cape Verde about the lack of decisiveness in Portugal’s colonial
welfare policy, and about the absence of clear programmes for the future of the
islands. In his words, he wished “for the improvement of the Cape Verdean land and
for the benefit of its populations, and for a more visible advancement of the civilis-
ing mission.”1
While his chosen expressions belonged to the standard repertoire of colonial
ideological terminology, his tone was sharp, leaving no doubt that Rendall Silva saw
the local situation as extremely unsatisfactory. He was angry and impatient about
the lack of funds to finally deal with the islands’ immense social problems, and,
above all, with the disastrous effects of drought and malnutrition that repeatedly
plagued a considerable part of the Cape Verdean population. Even in the late
1950s, voicing such critique under the conditions of the authoritarian Portuguese
state was still a remarkable act.
Hunger was a frequent companion of life on Cape Verde, and this had not only
been the case in the twentieth century.2 The annual rainy season during the sum-
mer months had long been critical for the physical survival of a large group of the
islanders: if the rains were scarce or did not fall at all, many were menaced by
starvation. Periods of drought became more frequent during the twentieth century,
as, apart from the general climatic conditions, the effects of land concentration, soil
erosion, and overgrazing by cattle damaged the quality of agrarian land. Between
1894 and 1924, an improved colonial statistical service revealed the real impact of
drought, as these periods repeated themselves six times in the short interval of thir-
ty years. After the Second World War, conditions remained dramatic. Between 1940
and 1942, in 1947 and 1948, and between 1956 and 1958 respectively, three pro-
longed periods of severe drought prevailed on the archipelago. They killed tens of
thousands of the Cape Verdeans.3 Other islanders emigrated whenever possible; in
those years they became desperate enough to accept contract labour on the
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infamous cocoa islands of São Tomé e Príncipe.4 When in 1975 the Republic of
Cape Verde became an independent state, first in a de facto federation with Luís
Cabral’s mainland state of Guinea-Bissau, the new government inherited a very pro-
blematic agrarian and nutritional situation. It had to make great efforts to create
more favourable general conditions, as its performance would mainly be judged—
both internationally and locally—by its capacity to deal in the long run with the
danger of drought.5
Laura Bigman’s Hunger and History in West Africa gives a long-term model of
the islands’ socio-demographic evolution as related to hunger and drought, from
the Portuguese discovery to independence and beyond. In Bigman’s model, self-
sustaining life on the islands was never really possible. From her perspective, the
Portuguese had by no means cared to improve the agricultural situation during the
entire five centuries of European domination over a population of mixed but, cul-
turally, mostly African inhabitants. This situation, according to Bigman’s model of
long-term processes, did not change in any way during the last decades of
Portuguese rule.6 It was only the transfer of power in 1975 that brought Cape
Verdean officials into the upper executive ranks, and those officials were the first to
make an attempt at improving the tragic situation.7
As has so often been the case in the historiography of sub-Saharan Africa over
the last two decades, Bigman’s book indirectly discards the idea of a late colonial
state with its own particular qualities. The concept of the late colonial state as a spe-
cific phase of Afro-European exchange, during which decisive developments were
initiated, has, over the years, found its defenders. Nonetheless, in total, it has not
become very popular.8 The idea of late colonial regimes has been discussed occa-
sionally for different regions of sub-Saharan Africa, and for different colonial
empires—for the African territories under Portuguese rule, for example, by Malyn
Newitt—but it has never become a guiding model.9 As Portuguese administrations
are rightly characterised as particularly underfinanced, chaotic, and repressive, it is
tempting to regard them as a continuing anachronism, even in the period between
1945 and 1961, or in 1974.10 In her overview of Cape Verdean history, Elisa Silva
Andrade held that only the end of the colonial regime could give a new impetus to
improve the socio-economic situation of the islanders.11 This idea had already been
expressed in the earlier and equally large study of António Carreira.12 As such, it
reflects part of the Cape Verdean national myth: the political elite of the early Cape
Verdean governments tended to describe the constraints of the post-colonial phase
as caused by centuries of Portuguese neglect.13 Attempts at revising this interpreta-
tion, pointing to eventual changes in the attitudes of colonial administrators before
the outbreak of the wars of liberation in Lusophone Africa, have been rather mar-
ginal, and they have not found any scholarly response.14 Thus, it is not surprising
that the general perspective of historians on Cape Verdean history between 1939
and 1975 is one of continuity. An analysis of the impact of a late and, eventually,
reformed colonial regime on the evolution of the Cape Verdean Islands is still lack-
ing.15
In spite of scholarly neglect of its history during the 1940s and 1950s, Cape
Verde is in fact a particularly interesting case for understanding the effect of late
colonial reform on the attitudes of African elites.16 It makes sense to conceptualise
the years between the beginning of the Second World War and the initial phase of
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the anti-colonial wars against Portuguese rule from 1961 as the first principal phase
of Portugal’s late colonial experience. From 1939, there was a dramatic combina-
tion of the peak of Portugal’s colonial economic exploitation with climatic and
agrarian difficulties on the Cape Verdean Islands; a period of weak rainfalls triggered
malnutrition and epidemics that affected a huge percentage—i.e. tens of thou-
sands—of the inhabitants. At the same time, the Portuguese colonial state had fully
entered into a dynamic of maximum exploitation of colonial populations, which
made it near to impossible to devise plans to help colonial subjects threatened by
poverty and famine. In 1961 the Second National Development Plan for the over-
seas provinces had just started to be implemented, but the anti-colonial wars
already had a strong effect on decisions for colonial reform. The Portuguese empire
was transformed into an empire under siege, and, far more strongly than for the
period before, any reform steps have to be read against the background of coun-
tering tendencies towards “radicalisation” and revolt within the colonies.
In contrast to other colonial administrations, the administration of Cape Verde
was one that was in large part composed by an African elite. Therefore, on the
archipelago, the links between colonial development and elite attitudes were more
immediate than in other African countries. The late colonial experience, with new
demands and offers for reform eventually taken up by the Cape Verdean adminis-
trative elite, can therefore be expected to be particularly interesting. There are two
methodological approaches to study this experience of Cape Verdean administra-
tors under the Portuguese late colonial state. First, social anthropologists interpret
the experience of Cape Verdeans through an interview-based approach.17 This
methodology tends to generate vivid accounts, which however have some consid-
erable weaknesses: the remaining informants for the 1940s and 1950s are now at
a very old age if alive; they have lived through at least fifty years of massive political
shifts; and many of the surviving witnesses reside in “exile” in Portugal. Hence, with
regard to these very much-politicised themes, it is highly problematic to come to
balanced interview results. Existing literature relying on anthropological data
undoubtedly has its merits, but needs to be complemented by the historian’s
approach—an approach that leads to an interpretation of the great quantity of
archival data that has so far been unexplored. In these respects, the analysis I make
is based on a new set of sources, and will help social anthropologists and sociolo-
gists to continue with their own studies on the safer ground of an elaborated his-
torical interpretation.
An Ambiguous Elite: Cape Verdeans as Late Colonial Officials
Under Portuguese Rule
An administrator on the islands of Santiago or Fogo such as Rendall Silva worked
in principle for the Portuguese colonial state, under the authoritarian and right wing
Estado Novo of Prime Minister António Oliveira Salazar. Being a Cape Verdean,
however, he would not be treated as a typical Portuguese official by his European
colleagues in the imperial services. By contrast, he would usually be subject to at
least some racist preconceptions from colonial officials at higher echelons of the
administrative hierarchy.18 As a native of Cape Verde, he was a member of a numer-
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ous peer group that in the 1940s and 1950s had found employment in a large
number of administrative positions, including some rather important posts. This
strong Cape Verdean presence in the islands’ colonial administration becomes obvi-
ous from a relatively long list of non-White government employees drafted by the
colonial government of Cape Verde in 1957; the fact that the governor felt it neces-
sary to send such a document to the Lisbon central authorities also shows how
concerned Portuguese administrators were with regard to the dominance of African
officials in this part of the “multi-racial empire.”19
Indeed, Cape Verdean officials in the Portuguese service played, without any sur-
prise, a double role. They functioned both, and at the same time, as representatives
of the government and as members of, and occasional advocates for, the African
subjects. The Cape Verdeans may have had a mestiço identity that distanced them
from the African populations in other Portuguese territories, but administrators born
as Creoles on the archipelago also were members of a distinctive African popula-
tion.20 While the central goal of my analysis is to observe how the mentalities of
those administrators developed under the conditions of the late colonial state
(between 1939 and 1961), it is obvious that Cape Verdean administrators had
access to some levers to affect the material well-being of people on the islands: indi-
viduals like Rendall Silva were thus likely to have a more engaged interest in the
advancement of the Cape Verdean infrastructure and economy. Even more, being
Africans who experienced their share of racial discrimination under Portuguese
colonial rule, officials from the archipelago were possible candidates to engage in
anti-colonial activities. This would have been even more likely in a period in which
other parts of West Africa already had their sails set for the process towards
decolonisation.
It is a common story that Cape Verdeans participated very actively in anti-
colonial resistance. However, the examples we have for that are mostly set outside
of Cape Verde. Patrick Chabal points in this context to individuals like the brothers
Amílcar and Luís Cabral or to future Cape Verdean president Aristides Pereira,
among other activists of the liberation movement, Partido Africano da
Independência da Guiné e do Cabo Verde (PAIGC), in Guinea-Bissau. Chabal has
argued that those Cape Verdeans were able to become important leaders in the
anti-colonial struggle particularly because they had overcome the ethnically framed
tensions between Cape Verdean “mestiços” and Guinean “Africans,” and had
created a sort of Lusophone pan-African elite sentiment.21 This may be true for a
distinctive Lusophone elite, who frequently shared a common background of
student life in and around Portuguese universities (and true only for a certain
period, because when Luís Cabral’s government was overthrown in 1980, the coup
d’état in Guinea-Bissau profited from negative feelings against the alleged
dominance of Cape Verdean “mestiços” within the Guinean population).22 Things
are more complicated for the bulk of Cape Verdean administrators, who normally
had not passed through university studies. They were mostly qualified through
secondary school education in São Vicente (or Santiago) and they never worked in
specialised services or departments, where the agronomist Amílcar Cabral had
been employed. To the contrary, those Cape Verdeans filled the posts related to
direct control of the African populations. As we will see, throughout the empire, the
respective Cape Verdean officials often followed a corporate logic that distanced
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them from the locals and motivated them to remain relatively loyal to the
instructions of higher-ranking Portuguese officials.23
In theory, Cape Verdean officials working in other Portuguese colonies could have
sympathised with the fate of oppressed African populations, as they witnessed face
to face the many hardships brought about by administration by the Portuguese
Estado Novo: forced labour was until 1961 ever-present in the Portuguese colonial
empire, as was corporal punishment, which according to the native code (indigena-
to) remained a legitimate option for every Portuguese administrator.24 However, elite
Cape Verdeans behaved as members of a Creole community when in service in the
other African overseas provinces.25 They enjoyed particular privileges in terms of
political and legal status and were frequently subject to an antagonism formulated
in racial terms by African locals in the respective regions.26 For Cape Verdean
administrators on their home islands, the situation was different—and still more
complicated. On the one hand, they had an evident opportunity to become lawyers
of the commoners on the islands, and they frequently had family ties to long-estab-
lished dynasties on the archipelago, which, in principle, guaranteed the connection
between those local authorities and a nascent “civil society.” On the other hand,
however, they emphasised their elite role and distanced themselves very strongly
from the “normal” islanders. Those who left Cape Verde to live in Portuguese exile
after 1975 continued to insist on their role as an imperial elite.27
Moreover, in spite of being themselves victims of occasional racist comments,
several Cape Verdean officials would nonetheless fully embrace the rhetoric of the
Estado Novo. Rendall Silva, for instance, was a strong promoter of the Moçidade
Portuguesa, the right-wing youth movement, and an adversary of the apparent
trend towards political liberalisation during the 1958 elections. Although living in an
authoritarian system made it, of course, more difficult to give opinions that would
have been in opposition to the propaganda of the regime, no one forced him to be
such an ardent follower of party institutions. In a way Rendall Silva’s attitudes are,
however, typical for the late colonial state: they combine both authoritarian behav-
iour and belief in modernism, critique against racism, and a feeling of belonging
more to the imperial structure than being part of an ‘indigenous’ population.28
I show in the following section how, in the 1940s, Cape Verdean officials would, fac-
ing the prospect of socio-economic crisis, extend their freedom of manoeuvre
inside the framework of the colonial state. I also analyse the particular ways in which
they challenged the desperate logic of recurrent drought and passiveness that char-
acterised Portugal’s colonial regime on the archipelago.
Passiveness and Disaster:
The Early 1940s on Cape Verde’s Southern Islands
In 1939 the general socio-economic situation was already more or less disastrous
in the Sotavento group of the Cape Verdean Islands. Not only was drought a per-
manent enemy, in the 1930s epidemic diseases were also endemic. On the island
of Santiago, malaria had become widespread in spite of the limited number of
breeding places for mosquitoes—poverty and hygiene problems were sufficient to
allow for the spread of the vector. In the 1930s, many islanders preferred emigra-
tion to the French-ruled territory of Senegal to life in Praia. Faced with such
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challenges, the colonial administration was completely under-funded even in the
capital city of the territory: the Cape Verdean administrator Bento Levy, who was in
charge of local government of the capital district, claimed he neither had the funds
to clean the administrative buildings properly, nor even a sum adequate to pay a
decent linen hardcover for the annual government yearbook, the boletim oficial!29
Under these circumstances, it was hard to imagine any well-funded initiatives
against poverty on the Sotavento island chain. As late as in the second half of the
1940s, newly installed administrators in the Praia concelho would complain that
they did not have available any inventories, statistics, or budget data. There had not
been any financial base to organise real bookkeeping, as the whole of the adminis-
trative services was running on the most rudimentary level.30
The smaller Sotavento islands were still worse off. On Maio, the administrator
claimed that while the island’s inhabitants were “full of humility, respectful, and
earnest,” the infrastructure of the island was nothing but ruins. The administration,
in 1939, even lacked the most basic means as would have been necessary for the
erection of fences to impede half-wild animals entering the farms of local peasants,
and thus to protect the minimum base of agricultural output.31 The central govern-
ment of Cape Verde gave priority only to repression: they invested considerable
energy to spot and arrest “subversive elements” among the few islanders who had
passed through basic education.32 There was, to the contrary, not even a tentative
plan to improve the islands’ overall infrastructure. The first complaints of Cape
Verdean administrators, occasionally angered by the lack of engagement on the
part of the colonial power, did not have any effect.
In Tarrafal, the northern district of Santiago Island, the Cape Verdean administra-
tor complained that there was little energy shown by the officials of the Portuguese
central administration, as those were “merely bureaucrats.” With the upcoming
hunger crisis of 1941/2, there was in the beginning no initiative to demand extra
food rations for poor families, and any visible engagement in model agriculture,
which appeared to be one possible way to escape from the recurrent crises, was vir-
tually unheard of. The administrator was indeed worried that a return of the hunger
crisis would lead to complete demographic disaster in Tarrafal District (which was
not far from the truth). However, he did not become at all active.33 More activity was
shown by the Cape Verdean administrator of Santa Catarina District on Santiago,
Augusto Barreto de Carvalho, who recommended better education facilities in the
rural areas, to teach peasants enhanced practices in local agriculture, and an
improved organisation of communal granaries: both were popular ideas to counter
renewed hunger crises.34 With this attitude of actively demanding improvements
from the colonial government, Barreto de Carvalho was a precursor of the new style
that would become far louder in the second half of the 1940s (and which primarily
demanded more basic education, although this definitely was a simplistic solution).
However, even in 1944 he was still a lonely voice.
Moreover, there is no sign that there was a transfer of information about the
concrete difficulties of the islands’ economic situation. European officials who
happened to work on Cape Verde could have been an important pressure group to
enforce improvements with the colonial ministry in Lisbon. However, at least until
the end of the 1930s, this group seems to have remained silent. After all, there were
far more prestigious positions elsewhere in comparison to administrative posts on
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the archipelago—and to obtain in the end a position as district governor in Angola
or Mozambique, it was advantageous not to be too critical with the official govern-
mental policy of the Estado Novo.
Thus, even after the first of the two dramatic famines of the 1940s, there were
few signs of open activity by Cape Verdean administrators in the Portuguese colo-
nial service. Interestingly, the highest government officials in the islands already
feared the Cape Verdean administrators as a dangerous source of challenges—
which was not yet the case.35 While everyone agreed that the famine years of 1941
and 1942 had been years of “sad memory,” the experience of widespread hunger
was still discussed as a phantom that somehow appeared and disappeared. Even
from the perspective of Cape Verdean officials, not much was to be done. Moreover,
while some insisted that generous loans should be given to needy and starving
peasants by the local administration, those same administrators held that the
situation was, in total, the peasants’ own fault.36 An official such as David Prates da
Silva bemoaned the lack of knowledge Cape Verdean peasants showed in putting
their lands to good use, but he believed that any attempt at improving these
conditions via more basic education was wasted. More clearly, he did not feel
responsible to start any initiative.37 For the elite group of Cape Verdean administra-
tors, there were no precedents indicating that the colonial state really was in any
obligation to help ‘ordinary’ Cape Verdean peasants. Negative comments about
these peasants were frequent, and even more so if the respective officials were sta-
tioned on the remote islands, like Brava or Maio in the case of the Sotavento group.
If those officials attributed responsibility for the grave situation on the Cape Verdean
Islands, they often blamed the local populations for their passiveness and apathy,
and, eventually, attacked fellow officials for being too lax when it came to enforcing
discipline:
It is regrettable, however, that this people are not intelligent and not hard-
working...And its situation illustrates, nearly constantly, that there are offi-
cials who, as being disinterested in all the issues respecting the island, do
not try to divert them from their wrong ways.38
A Turning Point: The Shock of 1947
The first years of the 1940s had seen severe devastation by drought on the Cape
Verdean Islands, including thousands dying of starvation. In 1942/3 the situation
was grave enough to motivate some members of the Cape Verdean elite to act
clandestinely. In a letter to the British Consulate in São Vicente, an anonymous
writer—very probably a Cape Verdean member of the administration—sent a report
to the “United Nations” (meaning in this case the alliance against the Axis during
the Second World War), hoping for British, United States, and Soviet support, and
requesting the “liberation” of the islanders from Portuguese mismanagement. He
underlined his claim with numbers about death rates and photographs depicting
starving peasant communities.39 Given the low level of protest among Cape Verdean
administrators during this first hunger crisis of the 1940s, we must assume that the
author of this report did still not represent a broader movement.
Things became even worse, however, in the second half of the decade, due tothe 
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Starving islanders on Fogo Island, c. 1943.
Courtesy of the National Archives of the UK, ref. FO 371/39617. Reprinted by permission.
cumulative effects of two subsequent natural disasters. As a result of the first
drought, malnutrition and lack of daily intake of calories had weakened many of the
surviving islanders, in particular the inhabitants of rural zones. The physical state of
local populations was sufficiently grave for recurrent drought to bring a still worse
catastrophe, as health service doctors had already warned in 1944/5. The disaster
occurred in 1947, when the rains on Cape Verde again failed.
In the five years between the first and the second devastating drought of the
1940s, the Portuguese Colonial Ministry—well in line with Minister Vieira Machado’s
basic objective to save funds—had blocked any further initiatives to prepare for
future disasters. Somehow symbolically, even plans for an improvement of access
to fresh water from volcanic sources had been abandoned. Therefore, the renewed
crisis of 1947, if not at all coming as a surprise, was not met with any existing emer-
gency plan on the part of the colonial administration. Eighty per cent of the inhab-
itants of the concelho of Praia needed immediate assistance.40 Generalised malnu-
trition on Santiago Island also hit the old plans for an improvement in the educa-
tional sector, a question that had dominated reform debates in Cape Verde since
the First World War. In the countryside, pupils would leave their schools to help in
agriculture wherever they could, in a desperate attempt at coping with the effects of
the drought.41 Other male adolescents, sometimes more successfully, sought
employment in public works—one of the few methods by which they could guaran-
tee themselves a meagre income that effectively protected them from physical
poverty, but not a very secure one in the long run, as even in the 1940s there were
few public works initiated by the colonial government.42 However, both forms of
temporary leave from the villages undermined plans for a better education pro-
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gramme on Santiago Island and elsewhere, and probably aggravated the long-term
consequences of the crisis.
More than in 1942/3, Cape Verdean administrators were traumatised by the par-
ticularly dramatic forms of the experience of the hunger crisis. At this crucial
moment, an attitude of protest based on the theoretical ideals of Portuguese colo-
nialism emerged, initiated by a colonial inspector who happened to serve as the
Administrator of Praia concelho, António Policarpo de Sousa Santos. The colonial
inspectorate in Lisbon was a main stronghold of colonial reform, and embodied in
a way the demands of the late colonial state: from the early 1940s onwards, most
of its members were extremely critical of the situation of colonial administration and
the treatment of African populations. The fact that Sousa Santos sent the governor
an accusing memorandum in place of his usual four-monthly report is not too sur-
prising for a colonial inspector. What is indeed exceptional is the fact that he wrote
this memorandum operating as administrator, and interacting with other, Cape
Verdean administrators. Sousa Santos’s protest against conditions seen no longer
as compatible with the ideals of Portugal’s (late) colonial state, was an important
trigger for a repositioning of the Cape Verdean administrative elite between 1948
and 1960.
Sousa Santos was, in fact, aware of the extraordinary nature of his report. His
descriptions were biting, and they seem as a whole very accurate. Taking up his post
in September 1947, the administrator was profoundly scandalised and shaken by
the situation of starving refugees (the majority of whom were male adults coming
from the rural districts of Santiago). Of those starving peasants a part—”vagrants
and beggars,” according to the local police—was interned on the Ilhéu, the rocky
island facing the beaches of the city of Praia. The inhabitants of this camp died in
the hundreds from hunger, weakness, and epidemics, and their dead bodies were
daily fished from the bay. The administrator was outraged by the practice of intern-
ment, which in his view was a sign of neglect, bad planning, and lack of interest on
the part of the colonial government of Cape Verde. He protested to the governor
with extremely harsh words:
When arriving here [at the Ilhéu] my hairs stood upright as I saw the state
of some hundreds of those creatures who had been thrown on this land for
the simple crime that they had begged for things they lacked: that is, for
food, which would help them kill the hunger that tormented them.
Moreover, your excellence, in no other land of the world, including even
Soviet Russia with all its barbarian practices, in savage Germania, or in Asia
with all its exotic manners, would the fact that they beg us to stop their
hunger be enough of a grave crime to merit such horrible punishment.43
This was still not everything Sousa Santos had to say; his critique filled pages.
Moreover, he immediately took practical measures: he evacuated the Ilhéu, creat-
ed an asylum in an old residence, and indirectly forced the members of the central
government services to act by putting the problem back again under their noses.
Under Sousa Santos’s direction, in the concelho of Praia, more than a thousand
beggars were provided with food and shelter in the residence, and in the infirmary
a total of 3,500 persons were temporarily lodged. After Policarpo de Sousa Santos
took over, the funds spent for social assistance grew to a level sixty times higher
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than the preceding month, climbing from a mere 619 Portuguese escudos to a sum
nearing 38,500.44 It seems that most of the Cape Verdean officials who had been
passive or at least silent during the months before followed Sousa Santos’s lead,
and took part, rather eagerly, in the aid process. Particularly in the urban district of
Nossa Senhora da Graça, but also in most of the other districts of the city of Praia,
the provision of clothes was another philanthropic exercise the administration final-
ly engaged in.
Like his Cape Verdean colleague, Rendall Silva, on Fogo Island eleven years later,
Sousa Santos was not a “liberal.” To the contrary, his attitudes were well entrenched
in the ideology of the Estado Novo. We have some documentation at our disposal
that illustrates the administrator’s attempts to censor the Praia radio station, the
Radio Clube de Cabo Verde, which was, Sousa Santos claimed, pro-American and
antinational.45 This attitude earned him the reputation of being “incompetent”—in
the 1940s many high Portuguese officials of the central administration of the archi-
pelago had no sympathy for what they regarded as politically over-zealous col-
leagues!46
Nonetheless, with his critical report on social conditions, Sousa Santos had over-
stepped the limits—in particular, his allusion to “barbarism” worse than in the Soviet
Union was obviously not to the taste of higher officials—and his interim position
ended rapidly. However, he had given a decisive impulse, which would in 1949 be
retaken by the colonial inspector, António de Almeida, who—himself a long-time
resident of Cape Verde—visited the islands and confirmed and retransmitted the
impressions given by Sousa Santos.47 As the problems discussed by both inspec-
tors would remain symptomatic, this critique constituted the fundament for a
catalogue of demands that Cape Verdean officials would formulate with regard to
the colonial state. Moreover, the shock that Sousa Santos and Almeida had
expressed in their reports was shared in the collective memory of their Cape
Verdean colleagues. After 1947, it was accompanied by the activities of the literary
and intellectual movement around the review Claridade, in which the Creole elite
reacted to the hunger crisis through cultural expressions.48 A direct influence of
Claridade on the opinions of Cape Verdean administrators is difficult to establish,
but there is no doubt that the cultural movement went along with a process of
increased awareness of the incidence of hunger crises as crises against which the
colonial power was insufficiently prepared.
Slow Process to Social Reform:
Cape Verdean Administrators in the 1950s
After the shock of the hunger crisis of the late 1940s, and in the light of nascent
protest from the milieu of Cape Verdean administrators, first steps toward visible
improvement were already being made at the beginning of the new decade. This
was particularly tangible in the city of Praia (where the presence and activities of the
International Red Cross made it all the more urgent to show foreign observers a vis-
ible programme of practical initiatives). The hygienic conditions in Praia became
notably better: parts of the slums of Ponta Belém were removed and their inhabi-
tants settled in new houses in Achadinha. Nonetheless, the Cape Verdean adminis-
trator José Manuel Gomes sharply criticised the fact that the city was, in spite of all
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efforts at social assistance, still a shelter for hundreds of beggars who had been vic-
tims of rural food scarcity during the crisis. Moreover, Gomes accused the central
services of lacking a coherent strategy for improving education, which was, as we
have seen, a prominent theme in explaining agricultural failures on Santiago
Island.49 One year later, commenting on the stagnation of further improvement con-
cerning the social and educational situation of the islanders, Gomes insisted that
the Portuguese government had to be still far more active. It would be a dramatic
error, the administrator held, to wait for the proper initiative of the rural or urban
populations of Santiago; apart from a very restricted elite group (in which he count-
ed himself), most of the inhabitants of the island were described by him as lacking
a rational understanding of the necessary measures.50 While this position remained
elitist, the concern shown was of a quality that in the late 1930s and early 1940s
had not at all been present among Cape Verdean officials.51
In the more rural parts of Santiago Island, namely in Santa Catarina, improve-
ments of the social situation of the peasants who were stricken by drought and
hunger came rather slowly. The Cape Verdean administrator of the district lament-
ed in the middle of the decade that the signs of socio-economic recovery were still
limited.52 In Tarrafal District, the official angrily remarked that the lack of public
services for mothers and families was deplorable.53 The critical tone was indeed
sharpened by Cape Verdean administrator Emílio Firmino Benrós. Benrós held that
Tarrafal District had good geo-economic conditions to thrive, but that first of all the
school infrastructure was to be improved, and that his Portuguese superiors were
simply too inactive to speed up matters. Those admonitions had some immediate
effects: there would be a visible improvement in the provision of school facilities
only months later.54 The new pressures coming from Cape Verdean officials met
with an improved funding situation, through the First National Development Plan,
which started in 1953 and showed some effects on the archipelago from 1954.
However, it is obvious that the change of attitudes within the Cape Verdean admin-
istration was not initially contingent upon the availability of these larger material
resources.
In 1954 first careful steps were also made in the direction of an alternative use of
the islands. Tourism was a new subject of discussion, albeit one that had to strug-
gle with the problem of the authoritarian nature of Estado Novo structures.
Nonetheless, the first coherent plans to open Santiago for tourist groups were pur-
sued from the mid-1950s, in response to pressure by Cape Verdean officials. At the
end of the decade, French settlers from Senegal and Guinea-Conakry would start
spending their holidays on the islands.55 In the logic of a bureaucratic reorientation
of socio-economic structures, the creation of tourist facilities came as a by-product
of creating an infrastructure for officials from the specialised services (houses built
in first instance for the temporary lodging of those officials could be used for
travellers).56
It has to be pointed out that the traumatic effects of the 1947 hunger crisis were
particularly strong on the two largest Sotavento islands, Santiago and Fogo. On
Maio—which was isolated and lacked facilities, and compared to which the other
two islands were well equipped—already the first drought of 1942/3 had had such
an effect on the Cape Verdean administrator, who openly showed his anger. He
complained that in 1942 the Portuguese government of Cape Verde had explained
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away the drama of thousands dying on the different islands through an unexpect-
ed and sudden lack of food. Yet, on Maio, the official held, Portuguese investment
was so meagre that deficient health services and hygiene made any high mortality
rates an unsurprising fact. In 1944, this administrator, Filipe dos Santos Silva
Júnior, holder of a degree in medicine, was still an isolated voice in an isolated posi-
tion.57 Only with the 1947 catastrophe was the basis for formulating critique found
within the Cape Verdean administrative elite, profiting from the conditions of a
slightly liberalised authoritarian regime. In 1947, the new administrator of Maio
would bitterly complain about the lack of education facilities and of sanitary posts,
and thus join the chorus of critical voices among the Cape Verdean officials.58 Eight
years later, both the access of the islanders to primary school education for their
children and the sanitary situation had visibly improved.59 Conditions on Maio
obviously were the most approachable of the problems: for its 2,200 inhabitants,
even a minor expansion of Portuguese budget spending brought some notable
changes in the overall picture.
As it happened, all over the archipelago local administrations profited from an
interval of better rainfall before the middle of the 1950s. This had visible repercus-
sions on emigration, as São Tomé e Príncipe and even Dakar became less attrac-
tive destinations.60 However, the efforts of the administration did not save Cape
Verde from renewed crisis in the late 1950s. First of all, the years of better rainfall
were not always a blessing to the Sotavento, as they were now likely to cause mud
avalanches and accidents. Thus, Rendall Silva complained in early 1957 about the
failure of the Portuguese government to respond to the heavy rainfall in the Santa
Catarina district of Fogo Island. The Cape Verdean administrator took the occasion
to annex to his main yearly report an angry account in which he claimed that none
of his recommendations for the improvement of access to drinking water on the
island had so far been responded to, and that the populations of the Chã de
Caldeiras (the volcano crater) and of the town of Mosteiros had justly protested
against the lack of modernisation in that regard.61 However, while stronger tenden-
cies to socio-economic improvement really paid off only from 1959, the general
trend was set through the engagement of Cape Verdean administrators from
1947/8. In 1959, for the first time, even the Estado Novo’s Sub-Secretary of State
for Overseas Development Issues felt he had to react to the current food crisis on
Cape Verde, a consequence of the drought period from 1956 to 1958. His circular
had a clear strategic component, as Portuguese government officials were well
aware that the failure to deliver the relative material wellbeing of the African popu-
lations in the Portuguese colonies was an excellent propaganda theme for any anti-
colonial movement. Nonetheless, the report also touched upon the image
Portuguese officials wanted to give of their overseas empire: according to this
image, twenty- to twenty-five thousand new deaths due to the effects of the drought
were a “national tragedy” of extremely embarrassing dimensions.62 As long as
Portuguese generosity towards the Cape Verdean Islands had not really been ques-
tioned, there had been little possibility for any damning self-critique from the more
liberal officials inside the Estado Novo. Now that the initiative of Cape Verdean offi-
cials had given an impetus, this perspective would transform itself into a more gen-
eral attitude of Portuguese high administrators, notably under Overseas Minister
Adriano Moreira in 1961 (then additionally motivated by the outbreak of real revolt
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in Angola).63 The Sub-Secretary of State for Overseas Development Issues formu-
lated this critique already in 1959:
Given the emotional wave that unequivocally guides the subversion of
European political rule in Asia and Africa, and which is only some months
away from the removal of the last traces of the colonial empires of the most
powerful nations, it is obvious that national stability [of the Portuguese state
with its African provinces] can only continue to exist if we show that we
boast of factors missing in the cases of other peoples. That means, we have
to be “a different case,” really different and not only in rhetoric. To fulfil this
necessity, the existence of a Portuguese inter-racial community has to rely
on solid facts that are profoundly lived: in our hearts, in our blood, in the
souls of a people that we call Portuguese on both sides of the sea.64
Doubtlessly, Cape Verdean officials tended to feel more valued at the end of the
1950s. It was one of the typical mechanisms of the late colonial state to give them
an impression that their opinion was now more seriously considered, and that they
were really part of an imperial elite. This may have been, in large part, only an
impression, as one might expect from an authoritarian and relatively disorganised
colonial regime. The impression played, however, a decisive role for the self-esteem
of this administrative elite. In this respect, Cape Verdean officials were not different
from other West Africans in the early 1950s, when the latter had become more inte-
grated in regional administration, without having already a clear expectation of the
transfer of power. On Cape Verde, enthusiasm became still greater with the start of
the term of the new governor, Silvino Silvério Marques, in 1958.65
This was all the more important as Cape Verde was, like the rest of the
Portuguese colonial empire in the early 1960s, considered a possible theatre for
subversion.66 At the beginning of the decade, rural protest seemed to be on the rise,
although in limited zones, and, on Santiago, mostly connected to the spiritual
movement of the rabelados.67 However—as Portuguese officials from the central
services understood them—problems in Angola had started in a similar way: with
the seemingly limited peasant revolt in the Baixa de Cassange.68 Therefore, there
was considerable anxiety regarding the possibility of a violent evolution in the more
remote parts of the peasant community on Santiago and on other islands.
In early 1962 there was widespread panic among colonial authorities in the
metropole that exactly this was about to happen, and that Cape Verdean adminis-
trators would in this process support rebel movements. Portuguese military officials
believed that “subversive activities” and attempts at rebellion were prepared not only
by the Cape Verdean community of Guinea-Bissau (where revolt finally started in
1963, with a huge number of Cape Verdean settlers among the sympathizers, and
several even in the rank and file of the liberation movement), but also on the archi-
pelago. Worries were so deep that the Portuguese military not only feared propa-
ganda, sabotage acts, and terrorist attacks (notably against Sal Airport), but even a
rebel take-over of one or more of the minor islands—including Fogo and Brava—
and plans for the declaration of an independent state of Cape Verde!69
In March 1962 Portuguese surveillance started to target Cape Verdean officials on
the islands. Secret police observers began first to screen the activities of the Cape
Verdean employees of the meteorological service on Sal Island, in the Barlavento
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(Windward) island group, before extending their activity towards other parts of the
administration.70 However, after thirty-six months during which Portuguese agents
had eagerly sought possible traitors, and checked on reported rumours of ships
landing clandestinely in São Vicente and Santiago, or had pursued individuals pos-
sibly attempting to steal weapons and ammunition from the army camps on the
islands, the Portuguese government had to admit there were no signs of any organ-
ised rebel activity in Cape Verde.71 In particular, most Cape Verdean officials
remained astonishingly “loyal” to the colonial regime. A majority of those officials
would after April 1974 migrate to Lisbon, into a sometimes inevitable, sometimes
self-chosen exile.
Conclusion
The case of Cape Verdean administrators on the Sotavento Islands of Cape Verde
between the 1930s and the 1960s shows that both changes in African elite partici-
pation within the Portuguese colonial empire, and the impact of the late colonial
state as a system centred on issues of “modernisation” and welfare, were important
for the process of creating a particular group identity during the phase preceding
decolonisation. Cape Verde, as a Creole colony under a particularly repressive colo-
nial system, seems to be an exceptional case. However, our analysis has shown that
although the circumstances of the Cape Verdean process were indeed particular,
they might nonetheless be an impressive indicator for the impact of late colonial
policies: even under the repressive conditions of the Estado Novo, the effects of the
late colonial state had strong repercussions.
This seems paradoxical at first. Laura Bigman has made the point that practical
measures taken by successive Portuguese governments against drought and
hunger in Cape Verde were not impressive in the 1940s and became only very
slowly more effective in the 1950s. However, according to the definitions of a late
colonial state committed to ‘modernisation’ and the provision of welfare, the Cape
Verdean situation was now redefined as scandalous by the officials involved. Thus,
the colonial administration could in the 1950s no longer evade the internal debate
on its own shortcomings. Moreover, the participation of Cape Verdean administra-
tors in the imperial structures became ever more widespread from 1930, and those
administrators were now also natural participants in the discussion on the obliga-
tions the Portuguese empire had towards its populations.
Cape Verdean officials appear to be likely candidates for nationalist engagement,
even in a repressive setting like the Portuguese colonial state, but, in the end, they
were not. In this particular case, the mechanisms of the late colonial state had
a very strong effect, this time in the sense of integrating potentially nationalist
individuals. While the Cape Verdean administrative elite was discontent with its
own role in the Portuguese Empire, and critical of the socio-economic situation on
the islands, the modernisation and welfare discourse of the late colonial state
allowed them to position themselves as the more active part of the system: after all,
they were the “specialists” (if only through their locations of birth) addressed in the
first line as being part of the modernisation process to come. Their opinions were
thus sought by the colonial regime, even by a colonial regime that was essentially
repressive and authoritarian in nature—with, nevertheless, a discourse that in       
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the 1950s became indeed more paternalistic than racial and “exploitative.”
The Diaspora situation of many Cape Verdean settlers in places like São Tomé e
Príncipe or Angola, from where they sent back the image of other Africans as less
civilised, might have contributed as well to make Cape Verdean officials consider
themselves basically connected to the empire. This connection is, still, little
analysed. Cape Verdean settlers from Angola very frequently transmitted the worst
possible opinions about their Angolan neighbours.72 On the roças, the cocoa plan-
tations of São Tomé, the Cape Verdeans remained a group apart from the rest of
the islanders: the principal news those settlers would eventually bring back to Cape
Verde was about the other Africans on the plantations as being violent and quarrel-
some.73 Coming back as reports into the group of Cape Verdean officials, such
descriptions did not help in producing sympathy among those officials for the
cause of the rebels in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique. Most would,
obviously, continue to see themselves as an imperial elite group—however, as an
elite group that would contribute according to the objectives of the late colonial
state to a paternalistic model of welfare creation, in which they would co-operate
with the Portuguese colonial government. The modernisation or reform discourse
of the late colonial state, flanked by first practical steps towards improvements, par-
ticularly appealed to the members of this elite group. In a scenario in which the
colonial power did not cede an inch towards political decolonisation, the reformist
agenda in social terms did only in its beginnings function as a vehicle of critique.
After some years, critical administrators began to see themselves as agents of a
social process that could only be imagined in imperial contexts.
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